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1 Introduction
An important challenge in economics is to explain what causes firms to exit. The standard
answer is low profitability. This answer leaves, however, open a number of questions as
profitability partly depends on factors that are diﬃcult to measure, for example, demand
conditions, eﬃciency and market structure. In addition, due to market imperfections and
regulations, other variables may also play a role in explaining exits.
In the empirical literature, several variables have been used in order to explain exits.
These include plant size, see Mata, Portugal and Guimarães (1995); capital intensity,
see Boeri and Bellmann (1995); financial leverage, see Dimitras, Zanakis and Zopouni-
dis (1996); productivity, see Olley and Pakes (1996); capital vintage, see Salvanes and
Tveterås (2004), and demand shocks, see Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2005). The
purpose of the present paper is to identify, through a structural microeconometric model
with heterogeneous firms, imperfect competition and adjustment costs, some key deter-
minants of exit behavior.
While traditional exit rules were myopic, such as Marshall (1966), modern theories
assume that the exit decision is based on both present and expected profits. In its most
refined version, the exit rule is derived from stochastic dynamic programming (SDP): The
firm will stay operative as long as the expected present value of continuing production
exceeds the value of closing down; see e.g. Hopenhayn (1992). Although SDP provides
an attractive general framework for interpreting and analyzing intertemporal decision
problems, huge computational requirements put sever limits on the number of state and
decision variables that can be included in the analysis. Because of the obstacles involved
in applying SDP, the literature oﬀers alternative approaches. It is an empirical question,
however, whether the SDP exit rule — applied on a model of strictly simplifying assump-
tions — provides a better explanation of observed exits than exit rules based on alternative
approaches.
For optimal stopping problems, a frequently used approach is that of Stock and
Wise (1990), who analyze the retirement decisions of older employees. In our setting, the
Stock and Wise rule says that a firm finds (at t) the exit time that maximizes expected
profits, given the current information set of the firm. If the “optimal” time to exit is now,
the firm exits. Alternatively, if the “optimal” time to exit is not now, the firm continues
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production and in the next period (t+ 1) reexamines whether it should exit immediately
or continue production, and so on. In the present paper we use the Stock and Wise
approach because it enables us to specify a much richer model of firm behavior than if we
had relied on SDP. Furthermore, it incorporates the important forward-looking aspect of
the exit decision problem.
In our model, each firm produces a version of a diﬀerentiated good. The demand
function depends on the prices of the firm’s product and those of the competitors. Firms
set prices simultaneously in a non-cooperative game (Bertrand competition). Production
requires input of labor, materials and capital. The latter is a quasi-fixed factor. The
production function incorporates both Hicks- and non-neutral technological progress.
We decompose unobserved diﬀerences in productivity and demand conditions into
a firm-specific permanent eﬀect (“initial condition”) and cumulated innovations. The
innovations are independent and capture neutral and non-neutral technological change.
Our model is consistent with Gibrat’s law that firms’ growth rates are independent of firm
size (see Sutton, 1997)1. Recent studies that model firm growth as a stochastic process
with a high degree of persistence comprise Klepper (1996), Klette and Griliches (2000)
and Klette and Kortum (2004).
While materials and labor are assumed to be fully flexible production factors, changes
in the stock of capital are subject to adjustment costs. We build on the theory of partial
irreversibilities, where the resale price of capital is assumed to be lower than the purchaser
price of new capital; see Grossman and Laroque (1990), Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger
(1995), Abel and Eberly (1996) and Bloom (2000). This theory allows for asymmetries
between investment and disinvestment.
We use our theoretical model to derive explicit relations between explanatory variables
and firm exit. Specifically, we estimate a mixed logit model where the two explanatory
variables are (i) profits net of adjustment costs and (ii) the stock of capital. Neither of
these variables are directly observed due to errors. Because the full system of supply
and factor demand can be formulated in state-space form, the conditional expectation of
the firm-specific unobserved (latent) variables, given the observed variables, can be calcu-
1The empirical literature suggests that Gibrat’s law is valid for large and medium sized firms. The
validity of Gibrat’s law for smaller firms depends on whether the analysis is limited to surviving firms.
See Sutton (1997) and Caves (1998) for discussions and further references.
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lated. The unknown parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood using a computer
algorithm written in GAUSS.
Our model is estimated for six export oriented manufacturing industries: Wood prod-
ucts, Rubber and plastic products, Metal products, Machinery, Electronic equipment and
Transport equipment. We use a new and detailed Norwegian micro data set for manufac-
turing firms for the period 1993-2002. In order to avoid problems related to multi-plant
firms, we restrict the data set to single-plant firms. Moreover, firms that disappear for
other reasons than “real” exit, for example due to a merger or takeover, are treated as
randomly missing after the last observation year.
We find that increased profitability reduces the exit probability, and this eﬀect is
statistically significant in all industries. Also the impact of adjustment costs is significant.
Our results suggest that the main characteristics of an exiting firm is not that its annual
exit probability is much higher than that of a surviving firm, but rather that the diﬀerence
in annual exit probabilities is highly persistent. It is the cumulated eﬀect of moderately
higher risk of exit over several years — compared with the average firm — which causes
exits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the theoretical model of the
firms’ operating decisions is presented when capital is quasi-fixed. Section 3 describes the
structure of capital formation, focusing on implications of adjustment costs. In Section 4
we explain the exit decision rule, which is based on Stock and Wise, and specify a mixed
logit model for exit. The model contains explanatory variables derived from the structural
model in Sections 2 and 3. Section 5 specifies the econometric model of supply and factor
demand and discusses identifying restrictions. The applied data set is presented in Section
6, whereas results are discussed in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Price competition and production
We consider a Bertrand game between n producers of a diﬀerentiated good. Each producer
is faced with a demand function of the following form:
QDit = ΦitP
−e
it
#\
k =i
P
1
n−1
kt
$σ
, (1)
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where QDit is the demand of output from firm i at time t, Pit is the output price and
Φit is an exogenous demand-shift parameter. Furthermore, e > 1 is the absolute value
of the direct price elasticity and σ is the cross-price elasticity of QDit with respect to the
geometric average of the prices of the n−1 other producers. As indicated by the notation,
the demand shift parameters are firm-year specific, while the price elasticities are common
to all firms.
The production function of producer i is assumed to be:
Qit = AitK
γ
i,t−1 [(witLit)
ρ +Mρit]
"
ρ , (2)
with elasticity of scale equal to ε + γ and substitution parameter ρ < 1. In (2), Lit
is labor input, Mit is material input, Kit is capital, and wit is a distribution parameter
determining the marginal product of labor relative to materials. Capital is assumed to
be quasi-fixed; capital services in year t are determined by the capital stock at the end of
t− 1, i.e., Ki,t−1. In equilibrium
Qit = Q
D
it . (3)
Our production function can be seen as a Cobb-Douglas function defined over capital
and an aggregate variable input obtained using a CES-aggregation function. The specifi-
cation (2) allows heterogeneity in labor productivity through wit: A positive change in wit
can be interpreted as a labor-augmenting innovation. On the other hand, Hicks-neutral
changes in eﬃciency are picked up by Ait. Both Ait and wit may shift over time and vary
across firms.
Let qLt and qMt be the unit price of labor and materials, respectively, and define qt =
(qLt, qMt). The short-run cost function, i.e., when capital is quasi-fixed, corresponding to
(2) is
C(qt, Ki,t−1, Qit) = cit

Qit
AitK
γ
i,t−1
 1
ε
, (4)
where
cit =
k
(qLt/wit)
ρ
ρ−1 + q
ρ
ρ−1
Mt
l ρ−1
ρ
, (5)
which can be interpreted as a firm-specific price index of the variable inputs. Note that
cit depends on the distribution parameter wit.
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The conditional (short-run) factor demand functions can be derived from (4) by Shep-
ards lemma:
lnLit =
1
ε(lnQit − lnAit − γ lnKi,t−1) +
1
1− ρ ln cit −
1
1− ρ ln qLt +
ρ
1− ρ lnwit
lnMit =
1
ε(lnQit − lnAit − γ lnKi,t−1) +
1
1− ρ ln cit −
1
1− ρ ln qMt. (6)
The short-run optimization problem of firm i, when capital is quasi-fixed, is to choose
the price that maximizes the operating surplus, i.e., revenue less variable factor costs:
max
Pit
⎧
⎨
⎩ΦitP
1−e
it
\
k =i
P
σ
n−1
kt − cit
#
ΦitP
−e
it
AitK
γ
i,t−1
\
k =i
P
σ
n−1
kt
$1
ε
⎫
⎬
⎭ . (7)
In the non-cooperative equilibrium, the first-order condition for firm i, given the prices
of the other firms (ignoring additive constants), is
lnPit =
ε
ε+ e− eε ln cit −
1
ε+ e− eε lnAit −
γ
ε+ e− eε lnKi,t−1
− ε− 1ε+ e− eε lnΦit +
σ(1− ε)
ε+ e− eε
#
1
n− 1
[
k =i
lnPkt
$
. (8)
Solving the first-order-conditions (8), using (1)-(6), yields a solution with the following
structure in terms of revenue, Rit ≡ PitQit, and the short-run factor costs qMtMit and
qLtLit:
⎡
⎣
lnRit
ln(qMtMit)
ln(qLtLit)
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣
a b 0
a b+ ρ
1−ρ 0
a b+ ρ
1−ρ
ρ
1−ρ
⎤
⎦αit +
⎡
⎣
γa
γa
γa
⎤
⎦ lnKi,t−1 + ν(qt), (9)
where ν(qt) is a vector function of prices common to all firms and
αit =
⎡
⎣
lnA∗it
ln cit
lnwit
⎤
⎦ , (10)
with
lnA∗it = lnAit + λ lnΦit +
1
n− 1
[
k =i
(d1 (lnAkt + γ lnKkt − ln ckt) + d2 lnΦkt) . (11)
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The coeﬃcients a, b, d1, d2, and λ in (9)-(11) are functions of the parameters σ, ε, and e.
In general, the loading coeﬃcient a is positive, while b is negative.2
Several special cases can be derived from (9)-(11). When σ = 0 we have monopolistic
competition, with a = (e− 1)/(ε+ e− eε), b = −ε(e− 1)/(ε+ e− eε), λ = 1/(e− 1) and
A∗it = AitΦ
λ
it . Furthermore, when e → ∞ we obtain a model with a competitive market
and a homogeneous good: a = 1/(1− ε), b = −ε/(1− ε) and A∗it = Ait.
We see that a is a common loading coeﬃcient of lnA∗it in all the three equations in
(9). This component comprises a linear combination of the Hicks-neutral eﬃciency term,
lnAit, the demand shift parameter, lnΦit, and the other firms’ state variables; i.e., their
eﬃciency, capital, cost and demand terms. On the other hand, a change in ln cit will have
a diﬀerent impact on revenues and factor costs: the loading coeﬃcient of ln cit is b (< 0)
in the first equation and b+ ρ/(1− ρ) in the material and labor demand equations.
An increase in wit, i.e., a labor-augmenting innovation, reduces cit. Thus, ceteris
paribus, both revenue and factor costs will be increased if b + ρ/(1 − ρ) < 0, while the
factor cost share of labor will be reduced if and only if ρ < 0 .
In Section 5 we will present an econometric specification of (9). This specification
accounts for firm-specific initial conditions, stochastic trends, industry-wide eﬀects and
various types of errors. The latter should be interpreted in a broad sense, so as to include
any transient deviation between the actual realizations of revenue, factor costs and capital
(including pure data errors) and their corresponding equilibrium level as defined in the
theoretical model (9). Such deviations are both realistic and important in practice.
3 Capital formation
We now turn to the structure of capital formation. We allow partial irreversibilities, so
that the resale price of capital, qSt, may be lower than the purchaser price of capital, qKt.
Let Sit ≡ sitKi,t−1 denote total sales (disinvestment) of capital during year t, where sit is
total sales as a share of the capital stock at the end of the previous year. Thus, sit < 0
2In the special case of n = 2 we obtain:
m = ε2 + 2eε− 2ε2e+ e2 − 2e2ε+ e2ε2 − σ2 + 2σ2ε− σ2ε2,
a = −m−1(ε+ e− 2eε− e2 + e2ε− σ2ε+ σ2), b = −εa,
λ = (−ε− e+ eε)/(ε+ e− 2eε− e2 + e2ε− σ2ε+ σ2), d1 = −m−1εσ/a, d2 =m−1(1− ε)σ/a.
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can be interpreted as representing (positive) investments. The adjustment cost function
can then be written as:
D(sit) =

sitξtKi,t−1 sit ≥ 0
0 sit < 0,
(12)
where
Ki,t−1 ≡ qKtKi,t−1
is the net capital stock at the beginning of year t (end of t− 1) in year-t prices and
ξt ≡
qKt − qSt
qKt
is an expression for the relative wedge between the purchasing price of new capital and
the selling price of used capital. Thus ξt is an exogenous time-specific variable. Note
that the adjustment-cost function (12) is weakly convex and kinked at zero: there are no
adjustment costs related to purchases of capital, i.e., when sit < 0.
We see from (9) that the firm’s operating surplus, Πit, is homogeneous in capital,
Ki,t−1:
Πit ≡ Rit − qLtLit − qMtMit
= hπitKγai,t−1, γa < 1, (13)
for a random variable hπit, that depends on αit and qt. We can then utilize a result from
Bloom (2000), which says that if hπit is a Markovian stochastic process and adjustment
costs are weakly convex, then the actual capital stock, Ki,t−1, and the hypotethical fric-
tionless capital stock, K∗i,t−1 (which can be adjusted freely at beginning of year t) will
have the same long run growth rate. Following Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen (2001), we
operationalize this as:
lnKi,t−1 = lnK
∗
i,t−1 + error,
where the error term is stationary.
The frictionless capital stock, K∗i,t−1, is the capital stock the firm would choose if
the marginal revenue of capital is equal to the user cost; see e.g. Haavelmo (1960) and
Jorgenson (1963). This can be found in two steps. First, we find K∗i,t−1 conditional on
output, Qit, by solving the following cost minimization problem:
K∗i,t−1 = arg min
Ki,t−1
(r + δ)qKtKi,t−1 + C(qt, Ki,t−1, Qit),
9
where r is the real interest rate, δ is the depreciation rate and C(·) is defined in (4). This
leads to the first order condition (ignoring additive constants)
lnK∗i,t−1 =
1
γ + ε (lnQit − lnAit) +
1
γ + ε ln cit −
ε
γ + ε ln(r + δ)qKt. (14)
Replacing Ki,t−1 with K∗i,t−1 in (6) and (8), and solving (1), (6), (8) and (14) with respect
to K∗i,t−1, Qit, Lit, Mit and Pit, we obtain the profit maximizing frictionless capital stock.
The solution has the form:
lnK∗i,t−1 =

κa, κc, 0

αit + κt (15)
for fixed coeﬃcients κa and κc and a time-varying intercept κt. In Section 5, we formulate
a simple error correction model for the stochastic variation in Kit around K∗it. Note that
K∗i,t−1 is the optimal frictionless capital stock at the beginning of year t (when Ait is
known). In contrast, the actual capital stock at the beginning of t, Ki,t−1, is quasi-fixed.
4 The Exit Decision
At the beginning of year t, the value of firm i’s capital stock is K i,t−1 in real year t prices.
If the firm decides to continue production for (at least) one more year, this generates
operating surplus, Πit, as well as capital costs. To derive an expression for the annualized
capital costs of an operating firm, we follow Caballero (1999) and write this as the sum
of the net flow payment on capital in the absence of adjustment costs: (r + δ)Ki,t−1 and
the adjustment costs: sitξtKi,t−1. Let π1it denote profit in year t of an operative firm:
π1it = Ωit − sitξtKi,t−1,
where
Ωit = Πit − (r + δ)K i,t−1 (16)
is the operating profit before netting out adjustment costs and Πit is the operating surplus
defined in (13).
Furthermore, let π0it be firm i’s profit if it closes down at the beginning of year t and
sells its entire capital stock. Then sit = 1 and the firm faces adjustment costs ξtKi,t−1(see
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(12)), but avoids the flow payment of capital, (r + δ)Ki,t−1. Hence the profit of a firm
that closes down in year t is
π0it = −ξtKi,t−1. (17)
We shall assume that (π0it, Ωit) are martingale processes and, furthermore, that
Et(si,t+s) = si. Thus,
Et

π0i,t+s

= π0it
Et

π1i,t+s

= Et

Ωi,t+s + si,t+sπ0i,t+s

= Ωit + siπ0it. (18)
The variables on the right hand side of (18) are not directly observable, since our economet-
ric model (see Section 5) distinguishes between the value of the variables in the theoretical
equilibrium described in Sections 2 and 3 and their actual realizations. The discrepancies
may be due to both transient fluctuations around the equilibrium levels and data errors.
We shall now obtain an expression for the present value of firm i based on the structural
model above and the Stock and Wise optimal stopping criterion. First, we consider the
expected present value Vit(T ) of producing until t+ T and then closing down — assuming
no exit option:
Vit(T ) =
T−1[
s=0
ϕsEt(π1i,t+s) + ϕTEt(π0i,t+T )
=
(1− ϕT ) (Ωit + siπ0it)
1− ϕ + ϕ
Tπ0it
* Ωit + siπ0it
r
+ ϕT (π0it −
Ωit + siπ0it
r
), (19)
where ϕ ≈ 1− r is the discount factor. In the approach of Stock and Wise, the maximum
of Vit(T ) is used to approximate the net present value of the firm at time t. Assuming an
infinite planning horizon, we see from the last equation in (19) that the optimal solution
is either Vit(0) = π0it or Vit(∞) = (Ωit + siπ0it)/r. That is,
max
T :T≥0
Vit(T ) =
 π0it if π0it > (Ωit + siπ0it)/r
Ωit+siπ0it
r
otherwise.
(20)
When π0it = 0, (20) has a similar structure as the value function derived by Melitz
(2003), who investigated monopolistic competition under exit options. In that article
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future profitability is known and identical in all years once the firm is established. Only
shocks unrelated to operational profits may cause the firm to exit later. In our model,
realized future profitability is uncertain, but, conditional on the information set at t,
expected profits are identical in all future years.
As in Melitz (2003), we also allow the exit rule to depend on an error term that
is uncorrelated with profitability, denoted χit. Specifically, we assume that the firms’
decision rule can be described as follows:
Close down production if and only if Vit(0) > Vit(∞) + χit, (21)
where
χit = τ i(ηit − β0t),
ηit, for convenience, has a logistic distribution, and τ i and β0t are unknown scale and
location parameters, respectively. The scale parameter, τ i, is assumed to be firm-specifc
to incorporate heterogeneity across firms with respect to the absolute magnitude of the
error term, while β0t is a time-varying intercept common to all firms.
Using (17), (20) and (21), the firm will exit if and only if
−ξtKi,t−1 > Ωitr − sir ξtKi,t−1 + χit
⇔ ηit < β0t + β1iΩit + β2iξtKi,t−1,
(22)
where
β1i = −
1
rτ i
β2i =
si − r
rτ i
. (23)
According to (22)-(23), positive discounted operating profits, Ωit/r, suggest that the firm
will continue production. Immediate exit will lead to adjustment costs, ξtKi,t−1, which
also suggests that production should be continued. On the other hand, if production
is continued the firm will expect adjustment costs in all future periods, siξtKi,t−1/r. If
si > r it may be optimal to exit immediately in order to avoid these costs.
According to (23), β1i and β2i are random coeﬃcients, possibly correlated, that vary
across firms. The structure of (23) suggests that the following stochastic specification
may be appropriate:

β1i −E(β1i)
β2i −E(β2i)

∼ N

0
0

,

σ21 σ12
σ12 σ22

, (24)
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for unknown parameters E(β1i), E(β2i), σ1, σ2, and σ12. Furthermore, when estimating
the model we will treat the ξt as unknown parameters with ξ1 = 1 as an identifying
restriction. Thus, we cannot identify the estimated ξt as the price wedge between the
resale and purchaser price of capital as in Section 3.
Finally, let zit be the indicator that firm i is operative in year t:
zit =

1
0
if i is operative in year t
otherwise.
We then obtain a mixed logit model of firm exit3:
Pr(zit = 0| βi,Ωit, Ki,t−1, zi,t−1 = 1) (25)
=
1
1 + e−{β0t+β1iΩit+β2iξtKi,t−1}
,
where βi = (β1i,β2i) is a vector of random coeﬃcients and (β0t, ξt) are fixed parameters
to be estimated.
5 Econometric specification
In this section we formulate a structural time series model in state space form that en-
compasses our behavioral model.
Supply and demand: Define:
yit =

lnRit, ln(qMtMit), ln(qLtLit)

, (26)
where all prices are real prices, i.e., all nominal prices have been deflated by the con-
sumer price index. The endogenous variables Rit, Mit and Lit are given by the structural
equations (9).
Combining (9) and (26) we obtain:
yit = θAαit + θK lnKi,t−1 + ν(qt), t = 1, ..., T. (27)
In order for (27) to represent (9), we impose the following restrictions:
θA =
⎡
⎣
a b 0
a b+ ρ
1−ρ 0
a b+ ρ
1−ρ
ρ
1−ρ
⎤
⎦
θK =

γa, γa, γa

. (28)
3See Train (2003) for a discussion and overview of mixed logit models.
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The latent exogenous variables of the model consist of the vector αit defined in (10),
whereas yit contains the endogenous variables.
The actual observations of revenue and factor demand may not be consistent with our
theoretical model. For example, according to (13) operating surplus is strictly positive,
whereas observations of negative operating surpluses are not uncommon in real data
sets. Thus it is necessary to include error terms that can account for diﬀerent types of
discrepancies. Let eyit be the observed counterpart of yit, including measurement errors
as well as (transient) deviations from the Bertrand equilibrium characterized by (13). We
will assume the following relation:
eyit = yit + eit, eit ∼ IN (0,Σ), (29)
where eit =

eRit, eMit eLit

is a vector of transient errors and 0 denotes a matrix of
zeros of appropriate dimension.
A consequence of (29) is that Ωit, which is used as an explanatory variable in the exit
probability (25), is not directly observable. Ωit is the ex ante (expected) operating profit
of a firm that is operative in period t, not the ex post (realized) profit. If the firm exits
in year t, operating profits will never be realized.
Capital stock dynamics: We now turn to the econometric specification of capital
adjustment. Despite partial irreversibilities, which we discussed in Section 3, investments
tend to be relatively smooth at the firm level when one type of aggregate capital is
considered4. This observation justifies the use of a linear error correction model as an
approximation to the capital formation process with (15) as an equilibrium path. That
is:
∆ lnKit = (φ− 1)

lnKi,t−1 − lnK∗i,t−1

+ εit (30)
= (φ− 1)

lnKi,t−1 −

κa, κc, 0

αit

+ (1− φ)κt + εit,
where εit is an error term with variance σεε. We can rewrite (30) as:
lnKit = κKαit + φ lnKi,t−1 + (1− φ)κt + εit (31)
4See Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen (2001) and Nilsen and Schiantarelli (2003).
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with
κK = (1− φ)

κa, κc, 0

.
The exogenous variables: Let us now consider the stochastic specification of αit. We
assume, provided the firm enters the sample at t = 1, that
αit =

αi1 t = 1
αi,t−1 + ηit t = 2, ..., T,
αi1 ∼ IN (0,Σ1), ηit ∼ IN (0,Ση) . (32)
The covariance matrix Σ1 of αi1 characterizes the cross-sectional heterogeneity across
firms in their first observation year, while heterogeneity between firms in any later year can
be decomposed into the initial condition, αi1, and the cumulated innovations,
St
s=2 ηit,
where the covariance matrix of ηit is Ση. In order to obtain identification, both the initial
condition, αi1, and the subsequent innovations, ηit, must have a mean of zero, since any
non-zero mean will be indistinguishable from the industry-wide intercept ν(qt) in (27) .
While it may be restrictive to assume that αit is a random walk, this assumption
conveniently simplifies the interpretation and estimation of our model. Moreover, the
random walk assumption is consistent with Gibrat’s law that firms’ growth rates are
independent of firm size; cf. the discussion in Section 15. Our empirical framework is also
largely consistent with the elaborate model of firm evolution in Hopenhayn (1992)6.
Combining (31) and (32), we obtain:

αit
lnKi,t−1

=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

αi1
lnKi0

t = 1

I 0
κK φ
 
αi,t−1
lnKi,t−2

+

0
(1− φ)κt−1

+

ηit
εi,t−1

t = 2, ..., T,
(33)
5This is not strictly true since it follows from (9) that:
∆ lnRit =

a b 0

ηit + γa∆ lnKi,t−1 + · · · ,
which indirectly depends on Ri,t−1 through ∆ lnKi,t−1. However, this link is weak when there are high
adjustment costs of capital, as our results indicate.
6Hopenhayn’s model accounts for diﬀerences in initial conditions as well as idiosyncratic innovations
during the firms’ life cycles.
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where I is the identity matrix, 0 is a vector of zeros and

αi1
lnKi0

∼ IN

0
0

,

Σ1 0
0 


ηit
εi,t−1

∼ IN

0
0

,

Ση 0
0 σεε

t = 2, 3, ... (34)
The scalar  is not estimated, but is set arbitrarily large to reflect a diﬀuse prior distrib-
ution of the initial capital stock, lnKi0 (see de Jong, 1991).
Appendix A shows how our model can be represented in state-space form with ait ≡

αit, lnKi,t−1

as the state vector. The state space formulation allows to incorpo-
rate transient errors in the capital data. Analagously to (29), we may observe Kit with
measurement errors. That is, we only observe eKi,t, where
ln eKit = lnKit + eKit,
for a transient error term eKit, with variance σKK.
Even though the state vector is unobserved by the econometrician, we can make in-
ference about its actual realization using the conditional distribution of the state vector
given the observed data on the firm. This is the basis for estimating the firm-year specific
exit probabilities of the mixed logit model (25). However, estimation of the model is
far from trivial. A maximum likelihood algorithm implemented in GAUSS is outlined in
Appendix B.
Identification: Since αit is unobservable it is not possible to identify the parameters of
θA defined in (28): The term θAαit in equation (27) is observationally equivalent to hθhαit,
where hθ = θAR and hαit = R−1αit for any invertible matrix R. Our structural model
does, however, imply a number of useful restrictions on R, which we shall now examine.
First, let
R =
⎡
⎣
r11 r12 r13
r21 r22 r23
r31 r32 r33
⎤
⎦ .
In order for hθ to have the same structure as θA, it must be:
hθ =
⎡
⎢⎣
hθ1 hθ2 0
hθ1 hθ3 0
hθ1 hθ3 hθ4
⎤
⎥⎦
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with hθ1 > 0 and hθ2 < 0. By considering the equation hθ = θAR, we easily derive the
following zero restrictions on R:
R =
⎡
⎣
r11 r12 0
0 r22 0
0 0 r33
⎤
⎦ .
Furthermore, we will assume that lnA∗it is independent of (ln cit, lnwit), i.e., neutral eﬃ-
ciency and demand shocks are independent of labor augmenting innovations. Then r12 = 0
and R becomes a diagonal matrix.7
The restriction r12 = 0 enables us to identify θA up to an arbitrary proportionality
factor for each of its columns. Equivalently, we can identify αit up to an arbitrary pro-
portionality factor for each component of αit. We choose to standardize αit by assuming
that the innovations, ηit, of the stochastic process αit have unit variance, i.e.,
Ση =
⎡
⎣
1 0 0
0 1 σcw
0 σcw 1
⎤
⎦ , (35)
where σcw is the correlation between ln cit and lnwit. We then obtain full identification
from the restrictions hθ1 > 0, hθ2 < 0 and σcw < 0, where the last restriction follows because
an increase in wit reduces cit; see (5).
6 Data and variable construction
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Industry (NACE) # of firms mean # of employees # of exits
Wood products (20) 947 14 236
Plastic products (25) 381 16 97
Metal products (28) 1498 16 384
Machinery (29) 1227 15 361
Electrical equipment (30-33) 785 17 232
Transport equipment (34-35) 795 33 242
We use a recently established database from Statistics Norway: the Capital database,
which contains annual observations on fixed capital (tangible fixed assets), revenue, wage
7Assume, conversely, that r12 9= 0. Then the first component of hαit is correlated with the other
components, while the first component of αit is not correlated with any of the other components (given
the stated assumption that lnA∗it is independent of (ln cit, lnwit)).
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costs, intermediates, and many other variables for all Norwegian joint stock (i.e., limited
liability) manufacturing firms for the period 1993-20028. The database combines informa-
tion from two sources: (i) accounts statistics for all Norwegian joint-stock companies, and
(ii) structural statistics for the manufacturing sector. The accounts statistics is of a very
good quality as it contains the audited accounting figures of the firms. The structural
statistics should also be of high quality, especially for firms with at least 10 employees,
since these figures are revised by Statistics Norway using electronic tax return forms.
In general, all costs and revenues are measured in nominal prices, and incorporate
taxes and subsidies, except VAT. Labor costs incorporate salaries and wages in cash and
kind, social security and other costs incurred by the employer. In this paper we analyze
six industries, which are relatively export oriented: Wood products (NACE 20), Rubber
and plastic products (NACE 25), Metal products (NACE 28), Machinery (NACE 29),
Electronic equipment (NACE 30-33) and Transport equipment (NACE 34-35). Table 1
presents some summary statistics for these industries. The numbers in the table imply
that in each sector the average exit frequency is around 20 to 30 percent.
The main statistical unit in the database is the firm: A firm is defined as “the smallest
legal unit comprising all economic activities engaged in by one and the same owner” and
corresponds in general to the concept of a company. A firm may consist of one or more
establishments. An establishment is a geographically local unit conducting economic
activity within an industry class. Because our data is at the firm level, we can distinguish
between single- and multi-plant firms. To avoid problems with the analysis of multi-plant
firms (which may close down only some of their plants, see discussion in Section 8), we
analyze only single-plant firms.9 In the industries we consider, only 10-20 percent of the
plants belong to multi-plant firms. When a single-plant firm is merged with or acquired
by another firm, or acquires a new plant, it is counted as ”missing” from the data set from
that year onwards. In a few cases, firms were excluded from the entire sample because
the value of an endogenous variable was missing for two or more subsequent years and
then reappeared.
8See “Documentation of the capital database. A database with data for tangible
fixed assets and other economic data at the firm level,” which can be downloaded from:
http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/10/90/doc_200416_en/doc_200416_en.pdf
9Caves (1998) points out that most results on firm growth and turnover are insensitive to the
establishment-firm distinction.
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A unique feature of the database is that it contains detailed measurement of the net
capital stock in both current and fixed prices at the firm level. Furthermore, the data
set distinguishes between two types of capital goods: (i) buildings and land, and (ii)
other tangible fixed assets. The latter group consists of machinery, equipment, vehicles,
movables, furniture, tools, etc. and is therefore quite heterogeneous. The method for
calculating capital stocks in current prices is based on combining book values of the
two categories of fixed tangible assets from the balance sheet and gross investment data.
Detailed descriptions of the method and the data are found in Raknerud, Rønningen and
Skjerpen (2003), including estimates of median depreciation rates for the diﬀerent types
of capital. Since our econometric model contains only a single aggregate capital variable,
we have constructed this as a Törnqvist volume index, where each type of capital is
proportional to the sum of: (i) the user cost of of capital owned by the firm, and (ii)
the total operational leasing costs. This aggregation corresponds to a constant returns to
scale Cobb-Douglas aggregation function for diﬀerent types of capital (see OECD, 2001).
7 Results
7.1 Estimates of factor loadings and capital coeﬃcients
First, recall that the vector of latent factors αit contains three components: (i) lnA∗it,
which incorporates cumulated Hicks-neutral innovations and demand shocks, (ii) a firm-
specific variable factor price index, ln cit, and (iii) the distribution parameter in the CES
aggregation of labor and materials, lnwit. Under the identifying restrictions stated in
Section 5, we are able to identify the loading coeﬃcients of αit in each equation. The
estimates for these loading coeﬃcients are depicted in Table 2, where equations 1-3 refer
to the structural equations (27) for revenue and the two types of variable factor demand,
whereas equation 4 refers to the capital equation (31).
With regard to equations 1-3, the estimated loading coeﬃcients of lnA∗it are very
similar for all the sectors and lie between .24 and .29. Moreover, all the estimated loading
coeﬃcients of lnwit — which, by assumption, is non-zero only for the third equation (labor)
— lie between −.22 and −.24. As seen from (28), a negative loading coeﬃcient is equivalent
to ρ < 0. Thus, labor-augmenting innovations (i.e., positive increments in lnwit) reduce
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Table 2: Estimates of model for revenue and factor costs. The standard errors in
parentheses are obtained from the inverse Hessian of the log-likelihood function
Industry (NACE) Eq. no. Loading coeﬃcient of: R2
lnA∗it ln cit lnwit ln Ki,t−1
Wood products (20)
1
2
3
4
.24 (.01) −.07 (.02) 0
.24 (.01) −.14 (.02) 0
.24 (.01) −.14 (.02) −.23 (.02)
.08 (.02) −.01 (.02) 0
.09 (.02)
.09 (.02)
.09 (.02)
.72 (.03)
.90
Plastic products (25)
1
2
3
4
.26 (.01) −.05 (.02) 0
.26 (.01) −.11 (.02) 0
.26 (.01) −.11 (.02) −.23 (.02)
.09 (.02) −.00 (.02) 0
.13 (.02)
.13 (.02)
.13 (.02)
.73 (.03)
.92
Metal products (28)
1
2
3
4
.26 (.01) −.02 (.01) 0
.26 (.01) −.12 (.01) 0
.26 (.01) −.12 (.01) −.22 (.01)
.08 (.01) −.00 (.01) 0
.09 (.01)
.09 (.01)
.09 (.01)
.67 (.01)
.91
Machinery (29)
1
2
3
4
.28 (.01) −.04 (.01) 0
.28 (.01) −.11 (.02) 0
.28 (.01) −.11 (.02) −.22 (.01)
.10 (.01) −.00 (.02) 0
.09 (.01)
.09 (.01)
.09 (.01)
.68 (.01)
.91
Electrical eq. (30-33)
1
2
3
4
.25 (.01) −.05 (.01) 0
.25 (.01) −.10 (.01) 0
.25 (.01) −.10 (.01) −.22 (.01)
.07 (.01) −.01 (.01) 0
.06 (.01)
.06 (.01)
.06 (.01)
.64 (.01)
.92
Transport eq. (34-35)
1
2
3
4
.29 (.01) −.05 (.02) 0
.29 (.01) −.14 (.02) 0
.29 (.01) −.14 (.02) −.24 (.01)
.08 (.01) −.01 (.02) 0
.14 (.01)
.14 (.01)
.14 (.01)
.72 (.01)
.92
the factor cost share of labor in all industries.
According to our structural model, the coeﬃcient of lagged capital, lnKi,t−1, in equa-
tions 1-3 is equal to γa. Its estimates are depicted in the fourth column of Table 2, and
vary between .06 and .14. This coeﬃcient can be associated with the return to scale,
which is clearly diminishing according to our results. Hence, either the elasticity of scale,
γ + ε, is less than one or firms have market power, e < ∞ ; cf. the discussion following
(11). Unfortunately, neither γ, ε or e are identifiable.
All the coeﬃcients in Table 2 are highly significant, with standard errors between .01
and .03. Our model is parsimoniously parameterized relative to the amount of data, and
we get a very high goodness of fit, as shown by our (pseudo) R2 measure depicted in
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the last column of Table 2.10 We find that R2 varies between 90 and 92 percent for the
diﬀerent industries, which is a very good fit for panel data.
Let us turn to the results of equation 4, i.e., the capital accumulation equation. From
the estimated loading coeﬃcients, we see that capital accumulation is aﬀected mainly
by shocks in lnA∗it. For example, in Wood products we see that the estimated loading
coeﬃcient of lnA∗it is .08 in the capital equation, which is 1/3 of the corresponding loading
coeﬃcients in equations 1-3. This indicates that if a Hicks-neutral innovation or a demand
shock increases revenue and factor costs by 1 percent, the capital stock will increase by
1/3 percent by the end of the year and by (1− φ)−1/3 percent in the long run; cf. (30).
Note that with φ = 2/3 the latter expression becomes 1 percent. In fact, the estimates of
φ are quite close to 2/3 in all the six industries, varying between .64 and .73. Thus, our
results show a strong link between innovations and investments in the long run, although
the speed of adjustment of capital towards the equilibrium path, K∗it, is quite slow.
7.2 Estimates of exit probabilities
Table 3: Exit probability estimates and likelihood ratio tests of parameter
restrictions. Standard errors of estimation in parenthesis
Industry Coeﬀ. of Ωit Test of: Coeﬀ. of Ki,t−1
ξt ≡ 1
E(βi1) σ1 P-value E(βi2) σ2
Wood products −.26 (.05) .18 (.04) .77 −2.19(.83) 2.20(.84)
Plastic products −1.00 (.40) .98 (.24) .67 −.21 (.27) .35 (.24)
Metal products −.65 (.13) .82 (.15) .84 −1.38 (.47) .92 (.24)
Machinery −.84 (.20) .67 (.16) .18 −.26 (.11) .12 (.04)
Electrical eq. −.44 (.17) .55 (.20) .67 −.93 (.36) .97 (.31)
Transport eq. −.41 (.11) .63 (.15) .72 −.15 (.07) .11 (.09)
Table 3 shows the parameter estimates of the mixed model of firm exit, with random
coeﬃcients βi = (β1i,β2i) and fixed coeﬃcients (β0t, ξt). From the second and third
columns of the table, we see that profits (before netting out adjustment costs), Ωit, have a
10The pseudo R2 measure is defined as:
R2 = 1− tr
gV ar(eit)
tr gV ar(eyit − edt)
where tr denotes the trace, that is, the sum of the diagonal elements.
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significant impact on the probability of exit. The coeﬃcient estimate of E(β1i) is negative
in all the industries. In Electrical Equipment and Plastic products, the estimate of E(β1i)
is between two and three standard errors away from zero; in the other industries the
estimates are between 3 and 5 standard errors away from zero. We also see that there is
considerable variation in E(β1i) among the diﬀerent firms within an industry: according
to our estimates, the standard deviation of β1i, i.e., σ1, is of the same order of magnitude
as E(β1i).
The eﬀect of adjustment costs, which enter the logit model through the term β2iξtKi,t−1,
is more complicated to analyze as it consists of a time-dependent industry-wide factor,
ξt, and a firm-specific random factor, β2i. When testing this specification empirically, we
find that it can be simplified: the hypothesis that ξt ≡ 1 was not rejected in any industry,
as seen from the likelihood ratio tests reported in column 4. Columns 5 and 6 show the
results for the expected value, E(β2i) and the corresponding standard deviation of β2i,
σ2, after the restriction ξt ≡ 1 is imposed.
According to (22), the exit decision depends, among other things, on the diﬀerence
between adjustment costs due when the firm liquidates immediately and the discounted
stream of all future adjustment costs. Table 3 shows that the estimates of E(β2i) are
negative in all industries and significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5 percent level, except
for Plastic products. A negative value of β2i means that high adjustment costs decrease the
probability of exiting immediately. Moreover, the estimates of the dispersion parameter
σ2 are significantly diﬀerent from zero in four of the six industries; the exceptions are
Plastic products and Transport equipment.
In order to evaluate the aggregate performance of our model, in each year we divide
firms into two groups: the continuing firms in any year t consist of the firms that did not
exit during the observation period, while the closing down firms in year t consist of the
firms which were operative at the end of year t but not in t + 1.11 For each firm we are
able to estimate — for each year — the conditional exit probability in that year12.
Figure 1 plots annual averages of the estimated conditional exit probabilities for the
11Hence, firms exiting in t+ s (s 9= 0) are not included in any of the two groups.
12Note that the probability of closing down at the end of year t equals Pr(zi,t+1 = 0| βi,Ωi,t+1, Ki,t,
zit = 1,) since zi,t+1 is zero if the firm is not operative at the end of t + 1. Thus, year t is the last year
for which the firm is observable in our data set. The information set of the firm, before choosing zi,t+1,
is assumed to consist of the variables that are known at the beginning of t+1, i.e., the firm knows Ωi,t+1
and Kit.
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two groups of firms.13 Our model discriminates to some degree between the two categories:
the annual exit probabilities of closing-down firms are consistently higher than those for
continuing firms, but the diﬀerences between the groups vary considerably over time and
across industries, from only a few percentage points to around 20 percentage points. The
figure clearly illustrates the diﬃculty of predicting the time of exit. We also note that the
changes in the average (ex ante) exit probabilities of continuing firms are small and show
no clear pattern over time.
7.3 Simulation of survival functions
The interpretation of Figure 1 is not straightforward as the graphs conflate diﬀerent
eﬀects. First, they reflect temporal variations in both firm-specific and industry-specific
conditions. Second, the annual exit probabilities are aﬀected by sample self-selection due
to exits and entries. For example, some entrants will become continuing firms, others will
exit during the observation period.
To obtain a more easily interpretable picture, we undertook dynamic simulations in
order to estimate ex ante survival functions, conditional on each firm’s vector of initial
conditions (eαi1, eKi0, eβi). The “hat” notation indicates that these variables are not directly
observed, but have to be estimated by their conditional expectations given the observed
data. For firms entering after 1993, we undertook the simulations as if the firms were
established in 1993.
We obtained simulated realizations of (ηit, εi,t−1) by random draws with replacement
from the actual realizations (eηit, eεi,t−1). Again, the “hat” notation denotes conditional
expectations given the actual data for each firm. Using the estimated mixed logit model
we first calculated exit probabilities for all firms in 1994. A proportion of the firms
were then eliminated by random draws from the conditional exit probability of each firm.
Technically, this was done by drawing a number from the uniform distribution on [0, 1] for
each firm and then removing the firms with numbers that were lower than their estimated
exit probability. For the “surviving” firms, new exit probabilities were estimated for 1995,
and so on. By repeating the simulations for each firm year after year, and averaging over
13While our data period runs from 1993 to 2002, we cannot calculate the 1993 exit probabilities since
that would require capital data for 1992 (In our model capital is lagged by one year). On the other hand,
because we also have observations on exits for 2003, we can calculate the 2002 exit probabilities.
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Figure 1: Estimated aggregate exit probabilities for continuing firms and closing
down firms
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Figure 2: Estimated ex ante survival functions for all firms, exiting firms and
non-exiting firms
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the firms within the industry, we obtained industry specific aggregate survival functions;
see Figure 2.
The figure contains three graphs for each industry: the (ex ante) survival functions for
all firms, the (ex ante) survival functions for firms that did not exit in that period (“non-
exiting firms”) and the (ex ante) survival functions for firms that did exit during 1993-2002
(“exiting firms”). The latter function was estimated by continuing the simulations of the
(annual) conditional exit probabilities after the exit time for these firms.
Figure 2 shows that in all industries the probability that a (representative) firm sur-
vives the whole 10-year period is quite similar across the industries; between 60 and 70
percent (”all firms”). This is consistent with the summary statistics in Table 1, which
show average exit frequencies between 20 and 30 percent: since several firms were estab-
lished after 1993, whereas the simulations assume that all firms were operative in 1993,
the aggregate survival probabilities after 10 years (60-70 per cent) should be lower than
those reported in Table 1 (70-80 pecent).
By comparing the survival functions for exiting and non-exiting firms, we can evaluate
to what degree our model is able to ”pick” firms that actually closed down during the
observation period. Overall we find that our model distinctly discriminates between the
two categories. For example, for Plastic products and Metal products we find that the
ex ante survival probability of exiting firms is about 20 percent after 10 years, versus 70
percent for surviving firms. For the other industries, the gap between the two graphs is
much narrower; about 30 percentage points (after 10 years). Our results suggest that the
main characteristic of an exiting firm is not that its annual exit probability is much higher
than that of a surviving firm, but rather that the diﬀerence in annual exit probabilities
is highly persistent. Hence, it is the cumulated eﬀect of somewhat higher annual exit
probabilities over many years — compared with the average firm — that causes a firm to
exit.
8 Conclusion
The purpose of the present study has been to examine the extent to which profitability can
explain firm exit. Using a structural econometric model in combination with the Stock
and Wise approximation of optimal stopping, we have derived explanatory variables from
26
economic theory and estimated mixed logit models for six export-oriented manufacturing
sectors. Our empirical model accommodates diﬀerent types of latent variables that pick
up unobserved heterogeneity between firms. The results show that increased profitability
significantly lowers the exit probability, while, ceteris paribus, firms with a large capital
stock tend to have lower probability of exit. According to our structural model, the latter
result can be attributed to the impact of adjustment costs.
We find that the diﬀerences in estimated annual exit probabilities between firms that
exited in the data period (1993-2002) and firms that did not, is moderate. Exiting firms
are not characterized by having a high probability of exit just prior to exiting. On the
other hand, the diﬀerences in estimated annual exit probabilities between firms that exited
in the data period and firms that did not is highly persistent. Consequently, there is a
significant diﬀerence between the survival function of the two groups. Comparing results
across the six industries, we find that the estimated survival functions of a representative
firm for each industry over a 10-year period are quite similar, with a survival rate between
60 and 70 percent after 10 years.
While exit is a key issue in the theoretical literature, the econometric literature on exit
is — to the best of our knowledge — rather scarse and often based on simplistic models.14
Many contributions to the field are featured in the 1995 special issue of the International
Journal of Industrial Organization. For example, Mata, Portugal and Guimarães (1995)
use duration models to estimate the eﬀect of plant size and of market dynamics variables
on the survival of new plants. They find that for Portuguese firms, plant size exerts a
negative eﬀect on the instantaneous failure rate. Boeri and Bellmann (1995) find that
exit among German firms is not responsive to the business cycle, while capital-intensive
plants and plants using advanced technology are less likely to exit. Doms, Dunne and
Roberts (1995) estimate exit probabilities for U.S. manufacturing firms, using plant char-
acteristics (age, size, productivity, capital intensity and technology information) in one
year as explanatory variables. A more structural approach, based on stochastic dynamic
programming (SDP), is found in Das (1992), who considers the problem of whether to
operate, hold idle, or close down production units in the cement industry. However, that
14There are several descriptive studies on firm exit. For example, Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988)
provide summary measures of the patterns of entry, growth and exit of firms in the U.S. manufacturing
industries over the period 1963-1982. They find substantial and persistent diﬀerences in exit rates across
industries.
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approach is hampered by the curse of dimensionality associated with SDP in multivari-
ate decision problems, which has often led researchers to use over-simplified econometric
models that do not fit the data well.
In the present study we have tried to integrate the study of supply, demand and exit
at the firm level using a simplified, yet complex, decision theoretic framework. One issue
that remains unresolved is the treatment of multi-plant firms, which we have removed
from our analysis, since they might have a diﬀerent relationship between plant profits and
exit: a multi-plant firm may take into consideration that increased output from one plant
will lower the output price, and hence hamper profitability of the other units. Due to
this strategic consideration, for multi-plant firms there might not be a simple relationship
between profitability and exits15. A topic for future research is to examine plant exit in
multi-plant firms.
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Appendix A: The state-space representation
The model (29)-(34) can be stated in the following state space form:
y∗it = Gait + dt + e
∗
it
ait = Fai,t−1 + ωit
t = 1, ..., T (36)
where the observation and state vectors are, respectively,
y∗it =
k
eyit ln eKi,t−1
l
(37)
ait =

αit lnKi,t−1

,
dt is a time-varying intercept vector and
G =

θA θK
0 1

F =

I 0
κK φ

ai1 ∼ IN (0,R1) , ωit ∼ IN (0,Rt) , e∗it ∼ IN (0,Σ∗e)
Σ∗e =

Σe 0
0 σKK

Rt =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩

Σ1 0
0 

t = 1

Ση 0
0 σεε

t = 2, ....
.
(0 and I denote a matrix of zeros and the identity matrix, respectively, of approperiate
dimension).
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Appendix B: The likelihood function and the ML es-
timator
We will now outline the procedure for estimation of the parameters of the modified logistic
model (25), β, and the remaining ”time-series” parameters, θ. For notational simplicity,
assume that all firms enter the sample at t = 1 (the general case is a straightforward
extension). All probability statements will henceforth be conditional on the inital capital
stock, Ki0, although for simplicity this conditioning is suppressed in the notation.
The observed data on firm i consist of {(zit,y∗it); t = 1, ..., Ti} (see Appendix A). Ti
is a realization of a random variable, say, τ i. We will now establish the likelihood as a
function of (β, θ).
Let νi = {ai1, ..., aiTi} denote all the exogneous latent variables of the state space
model (36)-(37). Let f(νi|Y iTi; θ) be the density of νi conditional on Y iTi ≡ (y∗i1, ..,y∗iTi),
let f(Y iTi ; θ) be the marginal density of Y iTi and f(βi; β) the marginal density function of
βi; see (24). Then the joint log-likelihood function l(β, θ) becomes
l(β, θ) =
N[
i=1
li(β, θ), (38)
where N is the number of firms, and
li(β, θ) = ln
] ] Ti\
t=1
P

zit|βi,Ωit, Ki,t−1, zit−1 = 1

f(βi;β) f(νi|Y iTi; θ)dβidνi
+ ln f(Y iTi; θ). (39)
A natural estimation strategy would be to maximize the log-likelihood with respect to
the unknown parameters. We can then utilize the state space form of (36)-(37), to obtain
f(νi|Y iTi ; θ) by means of the Kalman filter and Kalman smoother. The integral in (39)
can be evaluated by Monte Carlo simulations using the algorithm of Durbin and Koopman
(2002). However, the estimation problem remains complex because P

zit|βi,Ωit, Ki,t−1, zit−1 = 1

depends in a complex way on the parameters θ through Ωit and Ki,t−1.
In order to estimate β and θ we propose a two-step procedure, which we have imple-
mented in GAUSS 7.0. In the first step, simple preliminary estimates (hβ,hθ) are obtained
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as follows:
hθ = argmax
θ
N[
i=1
ln f(Y iTi; θ)
hβ = argmax
β
N[
i=1
ln
] Ti\
t=1
P

zit|βi, E{Ωit|Y iTi;hθ}, E{Ki,t−1|Y iTi;hθ}, zit−1 = 1

f(βi; β)dβi.
These are then used as starting values when maximizing (39) jointly with respect to (β, θ).
We find that the final estimates, (eβ,eθ), are close to the initial estimates, (hβ,hθ), and that
the method converges quite quickly. Visual inspection of the log-likelihood in orthogonal
directions (corresponding to the eigenvectors of the estimated covariance matrix) confirms
that we have found global maximizers.
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